Luther Lloyd – Battalion Command Narrative 1972-1973

1-33 ARMOR, 2^ND BRIGADE, 3^RD ARMOR DIVISION

FIRST MEN OF WAR

1 May 1972 – 1 November 1973

Many years have passed since I assumed command of the 1-33 Armor, 2^nd Bde, 3AD on 1 May 1972 at Coleman Barracks, Gelnhausen, FGR in a quiet and subdued early morning formation.  For the next 18 months the 1-33 Armor was to be home, and the daily activities impacting on my life and the lives of those serving with me were focused here.  It is doubtful that much, if anything, has been written about this or any other 3^rd Armor Division unit of the time.  After all, we served in the equivalent of a peacetime army, even though there were elements remaining in Vietnam that would not be totally withdrawn until March 1973.  Who wants to talk about a peacetime army unit?  I do!  I want to pay tribute to the hundreds of men who served so faithfully, competently and successfully during this period.  They did things for themselves and their unit that provided a great legacy of accomplishment for those who came after them, and they are entitled to be proud.  My words will never adequately express my deep and lasting gratitude, but I could not leave their story untold.  Their children and their children’s children have a right to know of their faithfulness to one another and their country.  If I had my way a “Cold War Service Medal” would be awarded to each member.  Had the bugle sounded, the enemy would have known they had encountered “Regulars by God!”

The battalion mission was to be part of the defense of Germany: specifically the Fulda Gap area east of Frankfurt.  Everything focused on being able to accomplish this in the most efficient, effective and least costly manner.  Combat readiness was the key word that needed to be engraved in the hearts and souls of everyone from the commander on down.  Making this a reality was the challenge because the army in Europe was still experiencing a great deal of turbulence in the personnel area created by the Vietnam experience.  The early out program reduced the availability of properly trained personnel, increased turnover rates had caused a great deal of stress for unit commanders.  Between 1 January and 30 October 1972, the 3AD received 12,500 replacements, or more than 1,000 soldiers per month.1  Secondly, a plethora of people programs were established to deal with the discipline, drug and race problems generated by the latter years of the Vietnam War.  MG Kraft, the CG at the time, hit the nail on the head when he said, “Most of our training problems stemmed from a conflict between training programs and people problems.” 2  Frustration of all concerned was often the result. Writing to the Brigade Commander concerning training management and scheduling techniques on 11 August, the battalion commander expressed his thoughts as follows: “The shear magnitude of the number and frequency with which new programs have been introduced in the course of the past year have forced an overall diffusion of the training effort.  Each commander has attempted to accomplish all assigned missions to the best of his ability. However, each has found that every program has the same priority and that few, if any, of the old requirements have been lessened. As a consequence, each commander balances the many programs as best he can with the multitude of programs and his personnel interests/capabilities working against maximized effectiveness of all programs at any given point in time. 3  Most will remember Human Awareness Training, HEADSTART, Equal Opportunity/Human Relations Councils, GED Programs, Drug Abuse Programs and RAP sessions.  All were well intended.  Some were absolutely necessary but some seemed to provide the disgruntled with opportunities outside, or at least on the very edge, of the chain of command.  These were never helpful.

Before discussing some of these programs in greater depth, it might be helpful to set forth the personnel situation.  The officer strength never reached TO&E levels of 33 at any time.  Shortages of appropriate grades and armor branch officers were constant.  Each Headquarters Staff Section experienced the assignment of at least two principles in 18 months, while there were three different Battalion Executive Officers, four S-1’s and four Battalion Maintenance Officers.  Headquarters and Headquarters Company had four commanders and each of the platoons turned over at least once.  Combat Support Company turned over once along with each of its platoons.  The tank companies experienced at least two CO’s, along with the assignment of six to seven different lieutenants, but a CO and two lieutenants were routinely available for duty at any given point in time.  From a training standpoint, the stabilization of key staff officers, company commanders and platoon leaders through tank gunnery and the unit tactical training tests was a major factor in successfully meeting division combat ready requirements. 4 It is a credit to these men that of the 25 assigned during this period only 15 were Armor officers.  Ten held commissions in other branches of the service.  All 25 acted as Tank Commanders during gunnery.

The enlisted picture was not too different.  Authorized strength was 497.  This strength was never attained.  At the time of the battalion change of command on 1 November 1973, there were 451 assigned, 411 present for duty and 349 present for training.  But that had been the situation for the last 18 months.  A review of the personnel strength in September 1972 showed that the battalion personnel turnover would result in an average of 31-33 tankers per company (50%) out of 64 authorized who would be with us for tank gunnery in May 1973.  On 12 October, commanders were informed in a note from the Division Chief of Staff that efforts would be made to maintain an assigned strength of 470.  He went on to say that some battalions were going to be hard pressed to turn out the required 204 crewmen for gunnery.  The CG was adamant that commanders not play with the MOS structure, i.e. moving infantrymen, etc. into tank crew positions. 5  But, numbers were only part of the problem.  The battalion was short 21 E-6 (SSG) tank commanders and 81 E-5 (Sgt) gunners along with two E-3s.  These shortages were off set by the assignment of 50 E-4s and 41 E-2s; both grades unauthorized in the TO&E for the battalion.  Thus, trained and experienced personnel were lacking and time was limited in terms of bringing those present and newly arrived up to speed and integrating them into appropriate crews.  If the battalion had not had some remarkable, hardworking and dedicated noncommissioned officers along with young men who were willing and able to perform well above their current grades, it could never have accomplished the tasks it faced. 6

The extended Vietnam drawn down generated many discipline problems in the army.  These were fostered by waffling politicians, the lack of a coherent decisive Vietnam policy at the highest levels of government, the press, the growth of a questioning attitude in the rationale for military service, the terrible treatment of returning veterans, and the publics attitude shift which came to hold the military in various forms of disdain.  All soldiers were affected negatively by these events.  When coupled with the fact that there are some people in every crowd who resent authority and do everything they can to rebel against it; the availability of drugs in Europe; the outward manifestations of the tensions experienced in the units between the races; and the non-availability of the required experienced noncommissioned officers, it is little wonder that units suffered unneeded and unwanted turmoil. 7  The 1-33 Armor was no different than any others in this regard.  In combination, these things had a negative impact on morale and espirit.  If you lived in the barracks, each played a significant role in your quality of life because they were factored into your perception of your status, treatment, happiness and overall satisfaction with your unit.  How they were handled touched you personally and became extremely important.  And, as some discovered, those things perceived as unfair, inadequate or just disliked in the hands of an intelligent charismatic troublemaker could lead to dissidence and disloyalty.  If not handled by the chain of command quickly and appropriately, things could go downhill in a heartbeat.

Commanders in the 1-33^rd always started with the assumption that all soldiers in their units were good, talented, hardworking and deserving of respect. On the other side of the coin, assigned personnel needed to respect one another and those in the chain of command.  Unfortunately, a few rotten apples spoiled things from time to time but not for long.  Minor racial tensions came to the surface on occasion, but they were always handled by a chain of command that contained a significant number of minority leaders.  RAP sessions were in vogue, but they did not seem to be the best choice for bringing problems to the attention of commanders.  The chain of command needed revitalization, strengthening, and disciplined responsiveness to the needs of the command.  Everyone worked to this end.  By the fall of 1972, the desired result was well on its way to being achieved.

A number of things had to happen to reinforce these endeavors.  The most important was demonstrating to all that the chain of command really had their best interests at heart.  Yes, they were expected to do there very best, but they could count on being supported to the fullest extent possible.  Raising morale and espirit depended on helping each soldier develop a personal enthusiasm and sense of pride for the tasks he needed to accomplish and a concurrent pride in the role he played on the team; whether it be crew, platoon, company, battalion, brigade or division member.  Of course, this is basic, but the battalion had to be refocused along these lines or success would not be achieved.  By September, the nickname for the battalion had been changed from the “Wild Boars” to the “First Men of War.”  Frankly, the name “Wild Boars” insinuated an undisciplined, self-aggrandizing and viciousness that did not seem to be fitting a professional military unit.  The first battalion of the 33^rd Armor needed to become the first in everything and until everyone started thinking of themselves that way, it was not going to happen.  As a consequence, the “First Men of War” motto was introduced at the end-of-month ceremony on 31 September.  By the time on-cycle gunnery started, pennants had been designed for the battalion and issued to every unit.  Observing the 1-33^rd on the move with pennants flying was a thrilling sight to behold because everyone riding under those pennants knew the blood and sweat they had contributed to the unit’s success.  These changes were minor in the overall scheme of things, but they stood as very important symbols of each member’s contribution.

During the spring of 1972, the V Corps Commander, LTG Willard Pearson, and his staff developed a program that came to be known as the “Fourth Meal of the Day.”  It amounted to opening our Dining Facility to the men of the battalion for hamburgers, hot dogs, French fries, etc. after duty hours in the evening.  Any excess food was to be used for this purpose.  The idea was to provide our soldiers with somewhere to go other than the local eating and drinking establishments in the evening.  At the time this idea was floated, it was rejected by the commander; not because the idea was bad, but because the cooks were marginally staffed and their duty day would be extended significantly to make this idea work.  He lost and the dining facility  began providing this activity on a daily basis.

                A year later, the new group at V Corp Headquarters was calling the program illegal, and set about to kill it.  Here again, the commander  was on the negative end.  He did not want to stop the program.  In the year since its inception, he had learned of its great value in building and maintaining espirit.   He believed that the men sincerely appreciated what was being done in their behalf.  However, the good work of our cooks in managing their resources and sustaining the program was not being duplicated in other battalions.  They just could not seem to pull it all together over a sustained period of time, and our success was contributing to moral problems in their units.  In fact, the other battalions in the brigade had previously dropped their programs.  That made our program of greater importance to our tankers.  Soon, of course, the men of the other battalions were trying to sneak into our facility and it was necessary to post a guard at the door to preclude this from happening.  Finally, he was ordered to stop the program, or else.  This was accomplished prior to his departure.   Unfortunately, the men were the ones who paid the price, but that was not a consideration at that moment.

A book could be filled with the other things that were instituted.  Many may remember the importance attached to training holidays and the increase in those received during the period; the Brigade’s development of the Bernbach race track for VW racing; the institution of the Best Company of the Month Award in October 1972 which meant an additional training holiday for the winner along with a streamer for the unit guidon; 8 the initiation of a battalion Soldier of the Month recognition in November which carried with it a three day pass, a Certificate of Achievement and removal from the duty roster for a month;9 the Brigade and Division sports program which resulted in numerous accolades for battalion athletes;10 and the German-American parades, Volksmarches and carnivals.11  A lot of work went into these events, but each did its part to raise the bar of satisfaction for the individual soldier.

The drug situation was a perennial problem.  The directives were clear: find the culprits and take appropriate action.  That was easier said than done.  Surprise urinalysis tests did put the finger on many, but confirmed identification of pushers, abusers and users remained a challenge.  The worst estimates indicated that approximately 30% of the assigned strength was involved in the use or experimentation with soft and/or hard drugs.  There was some question as to whether the actual problem was as high as the estimates indicated simply because the actions of battalion personnel did not evidence the lethargy and sluggishness one would have expected in their daily activities.

It is obvious that soldiers cannot succeed if their equipment is incapable of performing its mission.  The deadline report the battalion sent forward three months after LTC Lloyd assumed command left him with an empty feeling that the battalion might never attain a combat ready status by the time he was to depart.  Why?  Because the report showed that 46 of a possible 51 tanks were on hand with 24 of these being dead-lined for organizational and direct support maintenance, along with an overwhelming number of other tracked and wheeled vehicles.  Thus, the battalion was operating at 43% of its authorized armor strength.  Less there be any doubt, command emphasis was pretty dynamic at this point.  Having operational and well-maintained equipment was key to everything that had to be accomplished.  However, the reality was that the culmination of poor past maintenance, inadequate procedures and worn out equipment meant that going to war would have been devastating.  Many of the tanks had long sense reached the mileage criteria for turn-in and replacement.  At this point, six tanks had been turned in and five others had been inspected for turn-in.  With the arrival of Captain Hoyer and CW2 Scannell, the effectiveness of the battalion maintenance section began to take on new life.  But even they and the company maintenance sections were stymied by occasional failures in the system.  On 26 October 1972, BG Hoefling, ADC-B, visited the battalion.  He discovered that ten tanks, two M-88 recovery vehicles, four M114’s, and two M577’s had been waiting three months for turn in to MATCOM for replacement causing a space and safety problem in the motor pool.  He also discovered that 50% of the requisitions submitted to the 122^nd Maintenance Battalion in September had been lost. 12 A few words to the right people began to get things back on track.  Of course once a vehicle was turned in to direct support, we waited impatiently for a rebuild or new vehicle.  This often took more time than was thought necessary, but things began to happen.  Eleven months later, this situation had been turned around.  With a Herculean effort on the part of all concerned, 1 April 1973 found the battalion out-loading 51 freshly painted, 100% operational tanks for on-cycle gunnery at Grafenwohr.13  Such results gave everyone the right to have a sense of significant accomplishment.  But that was only part of the story.

Equally as important was technical proficiency in one’s Military Occupational Specialty (MOS).  Because of the personnel situation, it was imperative that every tank crewmen know his job as well as those of the other members.  To everyone’s credit, this was accomplished and demonstrated most clearly during the tank gunnery season, and during the crew tests of the special units in Combat Support Company.  Because of the busy battalion schedule, gunnery training was started in September and infused into the Battalion Training Schedule wherever possible right through the on-cycle MTA qualification firing from 4-11 May 1973 at Grafenwhor.  Table VIII firing on Range 80 was not possible because of extensive maintenance repairs so the division units used Range 42 for Table VIII firing.  For a few this change was disappointing, but considering everything the units faced at the time, it turned out to be equally as challenging.  The battalion’s success was truly noteworthy.  Qualification was achieved by 46 of the 51 tank crews with 25 of those crews being distinguished.  Of course, the goal was 100% but that was not to happen.  The result was that we placed third in the division the first time we tried.  The “First Men of War” had acquitted themselves remarkably well and we all sensed a surge of pride in what had been accomplished. 14

As the battalion went through Table VIII, those crews that did not do well on the day run were recycled through a number of night runs before they were permitted to fire their night qualification course.  By doing this, their actual firing was postponed until the very end.  In the meantime, division headquarters was receiving daily reports that showed that all the 1-33^rd Armor tanks on any given day had fully qualified.  Everyone on the battalion staff had a good idea as to what was going to happen, but the suspense kept building at division headquarters.  By the time 40 tanks had fired with none being dropped, the comments were quite humorous.  Then the day of reckoning came.  The suspense was over. 15  A Company dropped three, while B and C companies each dropped one.  But for the first time in a long time the vehicle combat ready status in combination with our gunnery results made everyone in the division aware that the battalion was ready to perform any task to which it was assigned.  The June 1973 alert found the battalion moving 50 of 51 tanks along with all but seven of HHC’s seventy vehicles.  This was better than any other battalion in the division and was a tribute to the hard work of everyone.

While the tankers were having their fun, elements of Combat Support Company were just as proficient in meeting the demands of their crew specialties. The Scout Platoon under the very able leadership of SSG Doyle R. Cowden, Platoon Sgt, repeatedly demonstrated its professionalism.  SSG Cowden’s crew succeeded in placing first in the division competition in both 1972 and 1973.  In the 1973 competition, five crews were tested with two of these being rated “Distinguished.”  SSG Cowden’s crew took first place in the division.  His crew included Sp 4 Clec E. Johnson and Sp 4 Thomas M. Samuelson. The second place division crew also came from CSC and included: Sgt Edward R. Jungblatt, Sgt Jerry D. Lee and Sp4 Chester D. Chapman.  The Mortar Platoon had its practice test in January 1973 and it’s ATT in July at Grafenwhor.  2LT Michael P. Ryan’s mortar men passed their test and just missed being a distinguished platoon by one round.  In July, 2LT Browell’s Ground Surveillance Radar (GSR) Section passed its Brigade test at Hohenfels and went on to achieve a Division Combat Ready Status in Sep 1973.  This was the first time the division had tested the GSR Section in three years.  There were no special tests for the AVLB Section, but SSG Jerry L. Caudill and his crew were on top of everything.

Overall, Headquarters and Headquarters Company performed its multifaceted functions in an outstanding manner.  The various staff sections encountered the same personnel problems and turbulence as the line companies.  Sometimes the impact was more pronounced because it affected the entire battalion, but the staff worked together as a team and solved the many conflicting demands placed upon it.  Because of the great number of varied functions performed by Headquarters Company, details would be inappropriate here.  It is enough to recognize the professionalism of those assigned as being superior in every way.  There was no doubt that a number of individuals at the company level had a few choice words of counsel they wanted to pass on from time to time (and they did) because the requirements were heavy for all concerned.  However, both the headquarters and the line companies seemed to work together in harmony to accomplish the mission.  This was to the credit of both and provided the battalion with a reputation of getting the job done in the right way.

2LT Stephen A. Slovensky, SC, led the Communications Platoon to a Combat Ready Status during its ATT in December 1972.  But that was not the half of it.  The Platoon was tested time and time again throughout the year because of the many tactical requirements placed on the battalion.  It always performed well and enhanced the battalion’s operational abilities.  During the fall of 1973, the Medical Platoon went through some extensive training that culminated in testing for the Expert Field Medical Badge.  Sgt. Patrick Koshiol, Sp4 Witson, and PFCs Randal L. Panasch, and Bobby C. Davis were the four members of the Platoon who earned the right to wear this badge.  Both of these platoons were facing ORTs in November following my departure.

Tactical proficiency needed to be as equally outstanding as the technical proficiency of individuals and crews.  The battalion’s schedule was full.  Army Training Test’s (ATTs), Command Post Exercises (CPX’s), Tank-Infantry Seminars, Field Training Exercises (FTX’s), and Sector Studies led to a significant increase in battalion capabilities.  The most noteworthy of these was the “Caravan 1” FTX, the largest scale maneuver in V Corps since 1961, and the first battalion-sized FTX for the 1-33 Armor since 1970.  Vietnam had definitely had its negative impact on our training and combat capability in Europe.  Obviously, all of this training was instrumental in helping the battalion achieve new levels of combat effectiveness.16  But all was not perfect.  A Company led the forward elements of the Battalion Task Force during the V Corps “Caravan 1 FTX” and was subsequently dubbed the best tank company in the 2^nd Brigade because of its first place performance during the ATT’s in July 1973 at Hohenfels.  It’s 2^nd Platoon, commanded by 1LT Michael P. Ryan, AR, took first place among the battalion’s platoons, while the 3^rd Platoon, commanded by 1LT Patrick O’Roarke, AR, took 2^nd place. 17  C Company placed second during it’s Company ATT while it’s 2^nd Platoon under the command of 2LT Gail W. Stark, AR, took third place in the platoon competition.  B Company ran into problems during the delay phase of its test.  While negative and upsetting at the time, it led to improvement.  That is what testing is all about; identifying problems and getting them corrected.  Obviously, nobody wants a problem when the real battle is fought and the smell of cordite hangs heavily in the air.  Sometimes all of us tend to forget this in the competitive world in which we live, but the concept is solid and paid off time and time again.  Between the end of the ATT’s and January 1974, the battalion participated in one 3^rd Armor Division CPX in October, but did not return to a major training area.  Small unit training, detailed company commanders sector studies, Q service of vehicles, platoon level training at Friedberg training area, conduct of border tours, guard duty, HEADSTART, MAIT, augmentation of the 2^nd Brigade Reserve Force, individual weapons qualification, race relations training, gas chamber exercises, a carnival, and the DA IG 18 dominated the activities of the units through the end of October.

In Arabic there is an expression: “One day honey, one day onions!”  All leaders from section to theater of operations have experienced this.  You know, everything is going along in fine fashion and suddenly things turn sour.  On 23 August 1973, the battalion had a USAREUR Mess Facility inspection that resulted in a memorable “unsatisfactory” rippling down the chain of command with a thunderous roar.  The following day, the DCINCUSAREUR visited Coleman Barracks only to find training unsatisfactory.  He also noted that the battalion commander was on leave, the commander’s confidence in his subordinates was a good sign, a considerable turnover was in progress, and that the acting commander and new arrivals needed to get with the program. Lightning bolt number two came zinging down the chain of command.  What a way to spoil a good leave!  In any case, there was no excuse for either result. This did not result in good humor.  The old timers in the outfit were known to have done better.  Surprisingly, the new comers were not more attuned to the environment in which they would be operating.  In one respect, these events seemed to nullify all the good reports of the past thereby leaving a bad taste in everyone’s mouth.  On the other hand, this was a good wake up call for all concerned as the battalion prepared for the DA IG.  Furthermore, the DCINCUSAREUR visit should have given the recent arrivals a new sense of urgency as they went about their duties in Germany.  The army in Europe was returning to its former status.

Everyone in the division was anxious to assist the battalion in overcoming its shortfalls and the staff recognized the problems faced by the units.  Of course, while sympatric, the mission took precedence and all the units were judged by the required operational criteria.  Thus it was that the Supply Evaluations by AIG Inspectors occurred on 26 February 1972 and again on 29 June 1973.  Both of these inspections were designed to help us get ready for the DA IG.  They did.  The battalion was basically rated unsatisfactory on the first inspection and marginally satisfactory on the second with the following comments: “A, B, and CS Companies must be commended for the tremendous effort put forth, particularly since all companies received an unsatisfactory rating during the previous SET.  Special recognition should be given because the supply sergeants are not school trained…The supply procedures in headquarters company progressed to the point where a superior rating would be appropriate…It should be noted that this battalion is operating with untrained, non-supply type personnel to a great extent in the unit supply rooms…an overall rating of satisfactory was achieved…”  Here again the personnel situation had a direct impact on job performance.  And, here again the individuals assigned to the various supply positions worked with a diligence and effectiveness that helped the unit achieve a creditable standing among the other battalions in the division.  The tremendous effort put forward by these men deserved everyone’s highest admiration.

I have tried to tell as much of the story as I can remember: good and not so good.  At the risk of being taken to task for forgetting an individual or individuals of particular merit, I have included names in the text or the notes.  We constituted nothing more than one of the many “Cold War” battalions standing ready in Europe.  We were not cited in dispatches or awarded unit citations.  We just did what we were supposed to do and had many achievements to our credit.  Above all, we attained a combat effectiveness and espirit that had not existed previously.  The motto of the battalion, FIRST MEN OF WAR, was indeed appropriate.  Each member contributed in his own way.  In the end, our effectiveness amounted to the sum total of those contributions and I believe we can all be proud of what we did.  While combat may be the true test of any unit, I have often felt that the more difficult task is maintaining a truly effective combat readiness in a peacetime environment.  The distractions are so numerous and the enemy often so remote.  You did it!  You can be proud of your service!  FIRST MEN OF WAR, I will always salute you. 

Copyright, Luther R. Lloyd, 22 September 2003